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ePiSteMoLogY aND ethicS
The need for a system of laws arises from the social nature of human 
beings. Laws are about relationships, just as practicing law and achieving 
justice are always concerned with relationships.1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Epistemology involves views about knowledge and how it is developed. It is the 
study of how individuals come to know the truth about given phenomena as it relates 
to the knowledge generation process: How is knowledge acquired, internalized, and 
applied to situations?2 The epistemology and ontology of a discipline affect the type 
of inquiry and the method of investigation used by professionals in that discipline, 
which in turn influence the particular phenomena that are the focus of and create 
meaning for the professional.3 Traditional legal epistemology is based on the 
Enlightenment principles giving reason and objective rationality priority status as 
pure sources of knowledge. Recent research on how the brain obtains and processes 
information raises important questions about whether pure legal reasoning is possible 
without attending to underlying emotional and relational variables.4
 In the discussion that follows, we present a model for enhancing legal education 
that is premised on changing the culture of the legal profession by adjusting the 
epistemology. Our framework raises some obvious questions: Can the study of social 
science theories enable a law student to be more professional and to act in more 
ethical ways by moderating each student’s personal epistemology? Can exposure to 
real clients with real problems help a law student to develop perspectives and 
techniques that will lead to a deeper understanding of clients’ needs and a more 
fulfilling role in society? What will it take to make a palpable difference in how law 
is practiced, how lawyers are perceived, and how the dominant societal narrative 
about the legal profession is expressed?
 This analysis draws upon recent research into personal values and how they 
influence behavior. Researchers have found that individuals are more likely to adhere 
to socially desirable behaviors supported by normative expectations.5 The social force 
of conforming behavior to that which is expected by others within a group is a 
powerful determinant of behavior. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the more popular 
or normative a behavior is, the weaker its connection is to personal values. This is 
1. Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of Professional Identity, 30 
Hamline L. Rev. 555, 559 (2007).
2. Barbara K. Hofer & Paul R. Pintrich, The Development of Epistemological Theories: Beliefs About 
Knowledge and Knowing and Their Relation to Learning, 67 Rev. of Educ. Res. 88 (1997).
3. Barbara K. Hofer, Personal Epistemology as a Psychological and Educational Construct: An Introduction, in 
Personal Epistemology: The Psychology of Beliefs About Knowledge and Knowing 3, 3–4 
(Barbara K. Hofer & Paul R. Pintrich eds., 2002).
4. See generally Kevin N. Ochsner & Matthew D. Lieberman, The Emergence of Social Cognitive Neuroscience, 
56 Am. Psychologist 717 (2001).
5. See Anat Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of Relations, 29 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1207 (2003).
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particularly true for people high in conformism values.6 The conclusions from this 
research are consistent with the realities in current legal practice where the dominant 
narrative is adversarialism and many lawyers, regardless of their personal values, 
tend to conform their behavior to meet this social expectation rather than feel 
disconnected from the profession. The necessary extension of this argument, and 
what we are proposing, is that if the legal epistemology is changed to be consistent 
with a relationship-centered, experientially rich approach, law students and 
practitioners will adjust their behavior in conformance with an emerging narrative 
that values the significance of extra-legal, contextualized elements of a client’s life.
 Part II of this article shows that insights from neurobiology and cognitive science 
lead us to question some fundamental aspects of law school education and how we 
train lawyers to interact with clients and each other. Part III reviews and critiques 
traditional narratives in legal education. Part IV examines recent calls for the reform 
of legal education. Part V outlines the core competencies and theoretical foundations 
of Relationship-Centered Lawyering (RCL). Part VI highlights three recent and 
important critiques of legal education that have challenged legal educators to 
reexamine law school curriculum and instruction. The main themes of these critiques 
and their implications for the relationship-centered approach are also examined. Part 
VII reviews the literature specific to clinical legal education in order to situate the 
RCL approach within this body of scholarship. Parts VIII and IX explore the 
question of how ethical and professional practice can be taught: first (Part VIII), by 
looking at the work of clinical legal scholars who have integrated ideas and research 
from other disciplines, and, second (Part IX), by building on this accumulated 
knowledge with additional research from the field of psychology. The latter work 
ref lects recent advances in the field of moral development as informed by 
neurobiological research. In addition, this section will examine the concept of 
empathy as a crucial component to professionalism and address questions about 
whether empathy skills can be enhanced with educational experiences connected 
with a relational approach to legal practice. The article concludes in Part X by 
examining some of the opportunities and challenges of integrating RCL into the law 
school curriculum and identifying the empirical research needed to evaluate relevant 
outcomes of such a change, including the impact of RCL in developing ethical and 
professional lawyers.
ii. nEUrObiOLOgY and COgnitiOn: thE rOLE Of EXpEriEnCE and CULtUrE
 Through neurobiological and psychological research over the past ten years, there 
is now general agreement that information processing and decisionmaking occurs 
not just in the cognitive realm but also in the body’s physical responses to a situation, 
as well as in the perceptions and emotions that are influenced by the life experiences 
6. See Jan-Erik Lönnqvist et al., The Moderating Effect of Conformism Values on the Relations Between Other 
Personal Values, Social Norms, Moral Obligation, and Single Altruistic Behaviours, 48 Brit. J. Soc. Psychol. 
525, 525 (2009).
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of an individual.7 What does the research tell us about how humans process 
information and come to conclusions about what they are experiencing? First, the 
brain receives information that we are aware of, the conscious, as well as inputs from 
our bodily systems that, generally, we are oblivious to, the unconscious. Conscious 
thought refers to the cognitive and/or affective task-relevant processes one is 
knowingly aware of while attending to a task. “Unconscious thought, on the other 
hand, refers to cognitive and/or affective task-relevant processes that take place 
outside conscious awareness.”8 Some authors have referred to the mind/body 
combination, particularly those inputs that emerge from automatic responses to 
stimuli, as embodied cognition.9 The concept of embodied cognition reminds us that 
human cognitive processes are not limited to those thoughts we can control. More 
specifically, it points out that many cognitive processes serve the larger goal of 
facilitating action in a specific environment and that cognition is grounded in actual 
bodily states.10
 Many cognitive psychologists theorize that the brain produces mental models 
based on experience and culture.11 These mental models are then tested by direct 
experiences with the world and adapt accordingly. The unconscious brain provides 
an expectation or predictive bias to the sensory input that creates probabilistic 
knowledge that inf luences perception, judgment, and problem-solving.12 This 
phenomenon is increasingly being studied in relation to such things as eyewitness 
testimony and awareness of bias errors.13 Many early developmental experiences 
actually create physical responses in the brain. For example, if a child grows up in an 
environment where the threat of violence is frequent, the experience of living with 
this threat can become “wired” into the brain (meaning there are actual physical 
changes in the brain from repeated incidents), leading to behaviors such as 
7. For an accessible, well-articulated overview of recent brain research, see Chris Frith, Making Up the 
Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World (2007).
8. Ap Dijksterhuis, Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought in Preference Development and 
Decision Making, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 586, 586 (2004). 
9. See, e.g., Anna Borghi & Felice Cimatti, Embodied Cognition and Beyond: Acting and Sensing the Body, 48 
Neuropsychologia 763 (2010). 
10. Barbara A. Spellman & Simone Schnall, Emerging Paradigms of Rationality: Embodied Rationality 35 
Queen’s L.J. 117, 119 (2009).
11. See, e.g., Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models and Deductive Reasoning, in Reasoning: Studies in 
Human Inference and Its Foundations 206 (Jonathan E. Adler & Lance J. Rips eds., 2008); Philip 
N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, 
and Consciousness (1983); Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth Byrne, Deduction (1991); P.N. 
Johnson-Laird & Ruth M.J. Byrne, Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference, 109 
Psychol. Rev. 646 (2002); William B. Rouse & Nancy M. Morris, On Looking into the Black Box: 
Prospects and Limits in the Search for Mental Models, 100 Psychol. Bull. 349 (1986). 
12. See Frith, supra note 7.
13. See Brian L. Cutler & Gary L. Wells, Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification, in 
Psychological Science in the Courtroom: Consensus and Controversy 100–23 (Jennifer L. 
Skeem et al. eds., 2009).
335
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
hypervigilance, constant scanning of the environment for risk, and strong reactions 
to stimuli that might not provoke others to action.14
 Similarly, the amygdala region of the brain can process traumatic memories.15 
This small central section is the most primitive area of the brain and is essentially 
reactive. Rather than processing a memory in the prefrontal cortex where it can be 
integrated with a person’s experiences and rationalized, the memory remains in the 
automatic, physical-response region.16 Consider the traumatic memory arising from 
an assault. The victim might be walking in a similar area to where the original assault 
occurred with similar sensory inputs: isolated, dark location, and the sound of 
approaching footsteps. The amygdala enables the person to react to these sensory 
inputs without having to go through the more time-consuming process of activating 
the cognitive system.17 When faced with a danger or threat, the amygdala immediately 
moves the body into a f light or fight mode because of the encoding of these 
memories.
 These examples illustrate the evolving understanding that biology, culture, and 
experience combine to influence each person’s development.18 These factors lead to 
the construction of a world-view, a set of assumptions about physical and social 
realities that may have powerful effects on cognition and behavior.19 Individuals thus 
process social information using schemas: mental structures that contain abstract 
representations of accumulated knowledge about similar characteristics or situations. 
People classify stimuli into categories and subsequently access prior knowledge about 
those categories (e.g., beliefs, expectations, inference patterns) to interpret and 
evaluate their present situation. It is schemas that “represent and store this knowledge 
in memory.”20 For example, an elderly woman in a wheelchair might generate a 
mental model of diminished intellect in an individual who has had such experiences 
with grandparents or neighbors or who carries this belief from media or family 
messaging. With both conscious and unconscious systems sending messages to the 
brain,21 the perception of a particular situation can be strongly inf luenced by the 
14. Robin Balbernie, Circuits and Circumstances: The Neurobiological Consequences of Early Relationship 
Experiences and How They Shape Later Behaviour, 27 J. Child Psychotherapy 237, 246 (2001).
15. For a review of recent research on posttraumatic stress disorder and brain activity, see Lisa M. Shin et 
al., Amygdala, Medial Prefrontal Cortex, and Hippocampal Function in PTSD, 1071 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 
67, 68–69 (2006).
16. See Scott L. Rauch et al., Exaggerated Amygdala Response to Masked Facial Stimuli in Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder: A Functional MRI Study, 47 Biological Psychiatry 769 (2000). 
17. M. Deric Bownds, Biology of Mind: Origins and Structures of Mind, Brain, and 
Consciousness 248 (1999).
18. Shu-Chen Li, Biocultural Orchestration of Developmental Plasticity Across Levels: The Interplay of Biology 
and Culture in Shaping the Mind and Behavior Across the Life Span, 129 Psychol. Bull. 171, 187 (2003).
19. Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, The Psychology of Worldviews, 8 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 3 (2004).
20. Mark J. Landau et al., A Metaphor-Enriched Social Cognition. 136 Psychol. Bull. 1045, 1047 (2010). 
21. Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 276–78 (1999).
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conceptual metaphors developed by an individual.22 We “routinely use metaphors to 
reason, make inferences, and form judgments.”23
 In the legal environment, this process occurs and may inf luence how lawyers 
handle cases. For example, a prosecutor may develop a personal schema or metaphor 
supporting the assumption that suspects brought forward by the police or suspects of 
a certain racial, ethnic, or socio-economic background are most likely guilty. The 
development of such preconceptions increases the danger of confirmatory bias: 
looking for and giving more weight to those facts and responses from suspects that 
confirm the belief they are guilty. Some nonverbal and emotional messages that 
come from the prosecutor may be received by the accused as judgmental and cause 
hostile or defensive responses that might further confirm the prosecutor’s intuition. 
Even where no such bias is present on the part of the prosecutor, the defendant’s 
previous life experiences may lead to the same process of receiving communications 
through a lens that is influenced by power or class differences, or family/culture/
media messaging.
 Emotion and the unconscious must be viewed as important components of human 
cognition rather than as processes that detract from rationality.24 “Importantly, 
context or situational factors do not simply modify what action, and thus, what 
cognitive process is appropriate, but rather they define the action.”25 Recognizing and 
integrating the data from feelings and emotions is a critical process in effective legal 
practice.26 In addition, recognizing and integrating the data from our own perceptions 
as inf luenced by our unconscious are essential both to add clarity to information 
input and to improve self-awareness leading to more accurate judgments and 
communications.
iii.  traditiOnaL narratiVEs in LEgaL EdUCatiOn: CrEating a pErsOnaL 
EpistEMOLOgY fOr LaW stUdEnts
Remember, what you are told is really threefold: shaped by the teller, 
reshaped by the listener, and concealed from them both by the dead man of 
the tale.27
 The scripts legal educators use to communicate legal knowledge and skills, as 
well as the myths created about the law, reinforce the dominant narratives of the 
legal profession and legal thinking. For example, the case method can be described 
22. See generally Landau et al., supra note 20 (providing a contemporary review of research on the role of 
metaphors in cognition that integrates the concept of schemas and the role of embodied cognitions).
23. Id. at 1060.
24. Spellman & Schnall, supra note 10, at 133. 
25. Id. at 135.
26. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 119 (2006); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation 
and Negotiation, 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 231 (2005). 
27. Vladimir Nabokov, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 52 (1941).
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as the process of discerning legal doctrine or theories from a series of cases in which 
appellate judges apply legal principles to particular fact situations.28 A law student is 
taught to use the case method to develop a level of certainty or truth about the law in 
a particular area. In addition, law students are taught to examine each side of a case 
and to construct the most favorable interpretation of the law, to identify analogous 
cases or competing statutes to support their argument. The construction of legal 
knowledge seems designed primarily for the adversarial system, where a theoretically 
impartial judge can independently examine the arguments of each side and render a 
winning verdict. The facts that many, if not most, legal cases never go to trial, are 
settled in negotiation or some form of dispute resolution,29 and that many lawyers 
never litigate a case are not fully reflected in current legal education.30 The adversarial 
preparation built into the education and enculturation of lawyers may actually create 
impediments to many of the processes fundamental to legal practice.
 Reasoning from legal principles carries a presumption that the application will be 
value-neutral.31 Pure legal reasoning directs the lawyer to focus on legally-relevant 
facts, spot the legal issue, and apply the rule of law to arrive at conclusions about 
legal strategy and argument. This objectivist position leads to the epistemology that 
has dominated legal thinking.32 The resulting ontology (the common terms and 
prioritized categorizations, principles, etc., that ref lect disciplinary meaning) is 
focused on traditional sources of law such as which statute, regulation, case, decision, 
etc. contains the answer to the legal issue. But, as important as legal reasoning is, 
this type of response fails on two levels of sufficiency. First, in the categorization of 
what is important, she may not be fully aware of a client’s needs and wishes (they 
may be inaudible to her if she is listening only for the facts relevant to the legal issue). 
Secondly, if she is focused on objective legal information she may be unaware of the 
perceptions, biases, and emotions she is experiencing and that are influencing the 
perception of the client and the narrative being disclosed. This can lead to 
communication and trust issues within the lawyer-client relationship, judgmental 
messages, and missed information. An experientialist epistemology33 or an emotional 
28. For a discussion of the contributions of Langdell to the development of the case method in legal 
education, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrines, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 
551 (2010).
29. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 
1256–63 (2005).
30. See Okianer Christian Dark, Transitioning from Law Teaching to Practice and Back Again: Proposals for 
Developing Lawyers Within the Law School Program, 28 J. Legal Prof. 17 (2003–2004) (discussing the 
need to broaden legal education to provide more access to ADR and other legal skills).
31. F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance Obligations: Preferences Lost in Metaphor, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 
1537, 1560 (1994).
32. Id. at 1556–61.
33. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989).
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epistemology34 would be practical and effective supplements to the traditional rational 
legal epistemology that has characterized most of legal education.
 Signature pedagogy has been defined as a teaching and learning model that is 
distinctive to a profession and one that functions as a window into the priorities and, 
moreover, the very essence of a profession’s work.35 Beyond the need to prepare 
students for practice, the signature pedagogies of the profession serve a role as cultural 
markers instilling critical ideas, language, behaviors, customs, beliefs, and values of a 
professional group. “Culture is often referred to as the totality of ways being passed 
on from generation to generation.”36 The experiences of students in professional 
education socialize them to these subtle but influential characteristics common to 
the practice of their chosen field.
 This professional acculturation process is embedded in the very interactions of 
the teaching/learning process. Flavio Marsiglia and Stephen Kulis describe 
acculturation as occurring in two distinct dimensions. Behavioral acculturation 
involves the adoption of the external aspects of the culture such as language and 
skills that allow the individual to assimilate. Psychological acculturation involves the 
adoption of the ideologies of the culture or the way the group sees the world.37 In law 
school, competition over grades, a focus on the intellectual skills of legal analysis, 
and the combative skills of legal argument provide students with the foundation of 
legal culture they take with them into practice.38
 Depending on the qualities of the supervising attorney, an externship or in-house 
clinic experience may reinforce this culture or challenge its relevance to legal practice. 
In the former case, students head into practice secure in the first principles of their 
discipline. In the latter case, students may well lack the opportunity to work through 
these conflicting messages. There is no legal knowledge or theoretical foundation in 
law schools that students can rely upon to analyze and inform questions of practice 
and standards for professional behavior.
34. Ryan, supra note 26, at 276–77.
35. Charles R. Foster et al., Educating Clergy: Teaching Practices and the Pastoral 
Imagination 33 (2005).
36. Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, NASW Standards for Cultural Competence in Social Work 
Practice 9 (2001).
37. Flavio Francisco Marsiglia & Stephen Kulis, Diversity, Oppression, and Change 6 (2009).
38. For a detailed discussion on the extent to which legal education inculcates in students “a culture of 
competition and conformity,” see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal 
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 515, 520 (2007). According to 
Sturm and Guinier,
[l]aw school culture emerges from the adversarial idea of law that is inscribed in the 
dominant pedagogy. It is reinforced by the prevailing metrics of success, which rank 
students through relentless public competitions (for grades, jobs, law journals, moot 
court, and clerkships) and provide very little opportunity for feedback that encourages 
students to develop more contextually defined or internally generated measures of 
accomplishment.
 Id. at 519–20.
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 In the traditional education of lawyers, legal epistemology is generally delivered 
through the signature pedagogy of the Socratic Method, and is often limited to 
cognitive analytic processes: reviewing appellate decisions and their specific legal 
reasoning and mastering legal principles and the language/style of legal analysis and 
communication. This method is extended into most lawyers’ practice beginning with 
a set of facts, spotting the legal issues, applying relevant legal rules and cases, 
employing analogical thinking, and, based on this construction of legal knowledge, 
determining guilt or innocence, liability of a client, or exposure or risk of a particular 
course of action or behavior. However, legal issue-spotting creates a tendency in 
lawyers to objectify their clients by seeing clients not as people but as legal issues.39 
As Katherine Kruse argues:
Consonant with their professional training, lawyers “issue-spot” their clients 
as they would the facts in a law school exam, reducing client objectives to 
bundles of legal rights and interests. Lawyers then pursue those legal interests 
in disregard of both their clients’ actual wishes and the harm caused to others. 
In the process, lawyers disregard their clients’ inclinations to be cooperative, 
moral and socially responsible and encourage the self-seeking behavior that 
accompanies legal interest maximization.40
 Susan Haack makes the important point that there is a difference between 
inquiry and advocacy in the construction of legal knowledge and the development of 
legal truths.41 Knowledge produced by the advocate may be “self-convinced” to 
support a desired outcome and may be lacking in ethical and contextual implications. 
Such legal knowledge may be purposefully interpreted to advance perceived client 
interests. Law school curriculum and pedagogy thus tend to focus the student’s 
attention on the legal question at the expense of the broader inquiry into client 
interests or the social, psychological, and relational implications of pursuing a 
particular legal strategy. This construction of legal knowledge has the potential to 
produce legal professionals who undervalue ethical and humanistic factors in client 
situations.
 To be clear, we are not arguing for an abandonment of traditional legal education. 
It is evident that the benefits produced by rigorous development of analytical and 
analogical skills are essential to effective legal practice. What we are putting forward 
is that these skills are insufficient for effective legal representation of clients, 
particularly regarding those legal issues that arise out of personal or ongoing 
relationships. We envision the social science theories and high quality practice 
experiences as essential to supplementing and completing the foundational elements 
of current legal education.
39. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 103, 124 
(2010).
40. Id.
41. Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology, 38 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 1053, 1070–71 (2008).
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iV. LEgaL EdUCatiOn rEfOrM
 Repeated calls to reform legal education have focused on a number of these issues, 
including the gap between legal education and practice,42 and the need for more 
humanistic approaches to improve law teaching and the institutional culture of law 
schools.43 Central to all of these concerns are the questions of whether and how we 
can teach law students to be ethical and self-reflective professionals. Although the 
legal academy as a whole may be faulted for ignoring these questions to a large extent, 
clinical legal scholars have grappled with these issues for well over two decades and 
have come up with a wide range of responses. These responses include theories 
developed largely by clinicians, such as “client-centered counseling,”44 “case theory,”45 
and “narrative theory,”46 to clinical teaching methods such as “rounds,”47 to concepts 
imported from other disciplines (including education, cognitive and social psychology, 
and philosophy), such as “adult learning theory”48 “ecological learning,”49 and 
“reflection-in-action.”50
 These pedagogical theories and methods contribute to the goal of graduating 
reflective and ethical professionals, although such approaches can only get us part of 
the way toward our professionalism goals. The key element that is missing from this 
42. See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933); Am. Bar Ass’n 
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Report and Recommendations of the 
Task Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools (1979) (sometimes referred to 
as the “Cramton Report”) because the chair of the Task Force was then-Dean of Cornell Law School 
Roger Cramton, who eventually became president of the Association of American Law Schools); Am. 
Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Task Force on Law Schools and 
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development—An 
Educational Continuum (1992) (known as the “MacCrate Report” because the chair of the Task 
Force was Robert MacCrate, a professor at New York University School of Law); William M. Sullivan 
et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (2007) [hereinafter 
“Carnegie Report”]; Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and 
a Road Map (2007) [hereinafter “Best Practices”].
43. See, e.g., Barbara Glesner Fines, Fundamental Principles and Challenges of Humanizing Legal Education, 
47 Washburn L.J. 313 (2008); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative 
Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory, 33 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 883 (2007); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 38. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 98–104.
45. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. 
Rev. 485, 487 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 9 (1994); 
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 
(1989); Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 
10 Clinical L. Rev. 833 (2004).
47. See Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A “Signature Pedagogy” For Clinical Education?, 14 
Clinical L. Rev. 195 (2007).
48. See discussion infra Part VIII.A–B.
49. See discussion infra Part VII.B.
50. See discussion infra Part VIII.E.
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scholarship is the idea of openly embracing a normative framework upon which to 
ground our teaching as well as students’ learning experiences (and yet the idea of a 
normative framework seems to be problematic to most legal scholars. The law 
operates with a normative framework, although it is a hidden one that is based on 
faulty assumptions. The “hidden norms” are premised on the idea that lawyers 
practice their profession as detached, neutral, and rational beings, and that they and 
their clients can be solely guided by legal precedent and statutory interpretation. One 
incorrect assumption of this legalistic framework is that emotion does not play a role 
in legal representation or legal decisionmaking. This fallacy has been dispelled by 
the growing number of legal scholars who have written about the role of emotion in 
the law.51
 Other f laws with the legalistic framework have been identified by supporters of 
the globally significant Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ) field,52 as well as other vectors 
of the Comprehensive Law movement,53 which have gained increasing momentum 
in recent years. These and other developments point out the need for the legal 
educators and practitioners to adopt a more holistic and humanistic approach to legal 
practice. At the same time, there are legitimate concerns with simply stating that the 
law needs to be more “therapeutic” or “humanistic”: Who gets to decide what these 
terms mean? And what ethics or values inform those decisions? If the normative 
framework amounts to lawyers or judges using their “gut feelings,” the approach 
would certainly be problematic. And if the framework amounts to the lawyer doing 
whatever the client says under any circumstances, most would agree that would be 
problematic as well.
 What is needed, then, is a normative framework that provides some other 
grounding to guide the ethical conduct of law students and practitioners. The 
framework must have some empirically tested (and testable) basis in knowledge that 
has accumulated over time. It must go beyond gut feelings and not be easily vulnerable 
to personal biases. It must be “client-centered” and it must also take account of the 
real world limitations of many clients’ ability to use rational thinking to analyze the 
legal matters in which they become embroiled.
 Susan Brooks and Robert Madden (co-authors of this article), both of whom are 
credentialed in the fields of social work and law, have articulated such a framework, 
51. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 26; Ryan, supra note 26.
52. For additional information about Therapeutic Jurisprudence, including a detailed bibliography, see 
Int’l Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2011).
53. See generally Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 Pepp. 
Disp. Resol. L.J. 1 (2006). According to Daicoff, the completed list of vectors includes “(1) collaborative 
law, (2) creative problem-solving, (3) holistic justice, (4) preventive law, (5) problem-solving courts, (6) 
procedural justice, (7) restorative justice, (8) therapeutic jurisprudence, and (9) transformative mediation.” 
Id. at 1–2 (footnotes omitted). These approaches are all interdisciplinary and rely upon social science 
research to a large extent.
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which they refer to as “Relationship-Centered Lawyering” (RCL).54 Relationship-
centeredness builds upon and enhances the client-centered approach, as well as the 
Comprehensive Law movement approaches, by adopting a normative framework 
drawn principally from the mental health fields that focuses on understanding and 
relating to the client “in context.” RCL thus contemplates a narrative that goes 
beyond the legal controversy and includes the many people and systems with which 
the client interacts. As such, relationship-centeredness draws attention to the 
significance of the entire range of professional relationships, including those involving 
co-counsel, other associates/partners, judges, witnesses, opposing counsel, and non-
lawyers who may be involved in legal matters. It also includes the lawyer’s 
self-awareness of extra-legal concerns that may affect his or her own effectiveness.
V. rELatiOnship-CEntErEd LaWYEring: thrEE arEas Of COMpEtEnCY
 The relationship-centered approach calls upon lawyers to gain competency in 
three important and distinct areas: (1) substantive theory related to a contextualized 
understanding of human development; (2) principles of just and effective legal 
process; and (3) perspectives on affective and interpersonal competence, including 
cultural competence and emotional intelligence.55 This relational framework provides 
an evidentiary base for its notions surrounding professionalism, by relying heavily on 
(empirically tested) theoretical approaches principally drawn from the mental health 
fields of social work and psychology. These include theories of human development 
and social interaction, particularly family systems and attachment theories. They 
also include approaches to procedural justice and practice approaches, such as those 
focused on strengths and empowerment, as well as cultural competence.
 A. Substantive Theory: Contextualized Approaches to Human Development
 Western legal systems, particularly the American legal system, stress 
individualism.56 Nevertheless, the social sciences, which essentially study what makes 
humans behave as they do, recognize that all of us are truly social beings and we live 
our lives as a part of many systems. Immediate and extended families, neighbors, 
networks of friends, and work colleagues are examples of social systems that provide 
each of us with support, resources, and identity. When faced with stress or when 
changes in membership occur in a system, each member of that system must adapt.57 
54. For a detailed description of the framework, see Relationship-Centered Lawyering: Social Science 
Theory for Transforming Legal Practice (Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Relationship-Centered Lawyering]. Significant portions of this article describing the 
relationship-centered approach and its components have been taken directly from this book.
55. Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden, Relationship-Centered Lawyering: The Emerging ‘Science’ of 
Professionalism, in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 3, 14. 
56. Kerry Dunn & Paul J. Kaplan, The Ironies of Helping: Social Interventions and Executable Subjects, 43 Law 
& Soc’y Rev. 337, 341–43 (2009).
57. For example, the loss of a family member through death or desertion can impact the roles of each 
remaining family member.
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In addition, what happens to individual members has a ripple effect on the larger 
systems to which they belong. These interpersonal dynamics help explain the need 
for legal professionals to consider context and environment in order to understand 
individual clients and to improve their own decisions and strategies.
 In the relationship-centered approach, lawyers must be prepared to understand 
clients and others they will encounter in their professional lives “in context.” This 
contextualized understanding requires an appreciation of extra-legal issues, such as 
the complex life circumstances facing clients or struggles within a law office culture. 
Most lawyers, however, lack a theoretical model from which to operate when assessing 
these types of needs and interests. Three theoretical perspectives provide the most 
up-to-date and useful research-based knowledge for this contextualized knowledge: 
family systems theory, developmental theory, and attachment theory.58
 Before discussing these theories, it may be useful to explain how we selected 
these particular approaches from among the vast number of theoretical models that 
exist in the social sciences, and even within the mental health fields, by which we 
mean psychology, psychiatry, and social work. This exploration originated with the 
authors’ shared interest in TJ, the field of inquiry alluded to earlier that examines the 
extent to which the law may have helpful or deleterious effects on the well-being of 
its subjects.59 As scholars and practitioners trained in the field of social work now 
engaged in the field of law, both of us were constantly struck by the gap between law 
as it was being practiced and fundamental principles we had learned and integrated 
into our work as social workers. We observed this gap starkly in family law, the area 
in which both of us were practicing and teaching. Once we were introduced to the 
critical lens of TJ, it gave us the language with which to express the bases of our 
critique of the law, as well as the invitation to introduce the normative framework 
drawn from social work to provide its content. Although our initial thinking was 
focused solely on family law, the more we thought about the teaching and practice of 
law in broader terms, the more we became convinced that these well-grounded social 
work theories can be useful to lawyers across all areas of practice.
 In considering what social work elements were most essential and yet most 
lacking in the field of law, we kept coming back to the theories and principles that 
provide a theoretical understanding of the person in context. Lawyers, regardless of 
whether they practice law as prosecutors or defense counsel in a criminal court or 
provide legal advice and coordinate deals with corporate executives, need to appreciate 
the broader contexts in which they and their clients are situated. Yet, for many 
reasons, including the legal system’s tendency to focus on the individual, as well as 
the historical absence of any serious attention to the interpersonal dimensions of 
practice in legal education and training, lawyers lack both the recognition of these 
contextual elements and the tools, in terms of substantive knowledge, with which to 
apply them to improve the effectiveness of their work.
58. Brooks & Madden, supra note 55, at 4, 14.
59. See David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, Int’l Network on Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, supra note 52.
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 The three substantive theoretical perspectives we have chosen reflect current and 
useful knowledge to which law students and legal practitioners should at least be 
exposed. The content of these theories directs lawyers to appreciate the importance 
of context, directs them to be non-judgmental, and to recognize and give voice to 
client strengths, autonomy, and dignity. Thus, the theories provide “scientific” 
grounding for professional values that probably most, if not all, lawyers would agree 
are essential to competent representation.
 The first foundational social science theory is family systems theory, which is an 
organizing theoretical perspective to structure a lawyer’s thinking about the life 
circumstances of individuals, such as herself, her clients, her co-workers, and her 
opponents.60 This theory explains basic systems concepts including family 
communication and transactional patterns, relationship factors, human development 
within the context of the family’s experiences, and the adaptability of systems to 
stress and change.61
 As knowledge of human development across the lifespan is central to effective 
assessment of behavior and emotions, the second foundational theory is developmental 
theory. For instance, a lawyer who understands her client’s life context is better able 
to counsel her client and to work for outcomes that support healthy development. 
This knowledge also pertains to other professional relationships, such as understanding 
one’s opponent in a litigation context or even in a transactional context. Developmental 
theory placed within family systems thinking allows the practitioner to appreciate 
both the stability of structure and the f luidity of change within a system.62
 The third foundational social science theory is attachment theory, one of the 
most significant developments in psychological research over the past fifty years.63 It 
is not enough for a lawyer to understand the current family system context and 
developmental stage of clients if they experienced early problems with attachment 
relationships to caregivers. Attachment problems can impact long-term functioning, 
although the effects of disrupted attachments can be overcome with a supportive 
environment.64 Early attachment problems can create a powerful and enduring 
narrative, an internal representation about self that influences future relationships, 
including the lawyer-client relationship.65
60. Robert G. Madden, From Theory to Practice: A Family Systems Approach to the Law, 30 T. Jefferson L. 
Rev. 429, 431 (2008).
61. Karen L. Fingerman & Eric Bermann, Applications of Family Systems Theory to the Study of Adulthood, 51 
Int’l J. of Aging & Hum. Dev. 5, 9 (2000).
62. Id. at 18–19 (describing this stability and change as “continuity” within a family system and discussing 
the impact of enduring roles and patterns on family members over time). 
63. Alan Sroufe & Daniel Siegel, The Verdict Is In: The Case for Attachment Theory, Psychotherapy 
Networker Mag., March–April 2011, http://www.psychotherapynetworker.org/magazine/
recentissues/1271-the-verdict-is-in.
64. Ross A. Thompson, The Legacy of Early Attachments, 71 Child Dev. 145, 146–47 (2000). 
65. Id. at 149. 
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 All of these theoretical approaches are interconnected and build upon each other 
in significant ways. These theories are also normative in that they pertain to all 
individuals and families across a wide range of circumstances and are somewhat 
prescriptive in terms of how to approach and understand clients. Most importantly 
perhaps, all of these approaches focus on the interdependency in human relationships. 
A basic understanding of these important social science perspectives is not only 
valuable to individual client representation and other types of direct legal services. It 
is also valuable from the standpoint of legal policy development and law reform.66 
Although law generally can be viewed as a set of rules governing the relationships of 
people in a society, there is much more substance to the law than a codification of 
morals and values. Law is deeply embedded in and reflective of its own context—the 
culture in which it is situated. As a result, the social sciences are essential to our 
understanding of the creation and construction of the law. By focusing on systems, 
lawyers can gain insight into the social context of the case and will be more likely to 
act in ways that are relevant to a client’s experience.
 Social science considerations lead to a reexamination of many aspects of legal 
practice. These perspectives raise questions about how we educate and train lawyers, 
judges, and other court personnel.
 B.  Process-Oriented Considerations: Fairness, Justice, and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution
 The second competency area explores the qualities that are necessary to provide 
clients with a sense of trust and respect for the law and its actors, as well as the 
underlying values that guide the analysis of issues and decisionmaking. In making 
this argument for building trust in the legal system, we recognize that, in some 
cases, those in positions of legal authority and those who practice law may not deserve 
the respect of the public. However, this factor should not be a disincentive to the 
work of reconstructing a positive narrative about legal practice. Otherwise, the 
unprofessional behavior becomes self-perpetuating as it leads those lawyers who wish 
to practice in more collaborative ways unable to risk trusting in their adversaries or 
the system. In those cases where power is being yielded to deny a client rights or 
manipulate the system, more adversarial tactics are available, but this should be a 
strategic decision rather than a standard response.
 All encounters with the legal system, whether or not they are voluntary, involve 
process issues such as questions of trust, respect, fair-mindedness, judgment, and 
perceptions around the opportunity to be heard.67 Relationship-centeredness requires 
attending to psychological factors, enhancing positive feelings, and minimizing anti-
therapeutic costs, all of which generally support alternatives to traditional 
adversarialism. Empirical research recognizes the importance of fair and just process 
inasmuch as when people are treated fairly they are more likely to have respect for 
66. An examination of the usefulness of RCL to the development of legal policy and law reform is a 
promising area for future exploration.
67. Brooks & Madden, supra note 55, at 2–4.
346
ePiSteMoLogY aND ethicS
the system, which leads to increased compliance with decisions of legal authorities.68 
This important research calls into question the efficacy of many parts of the judicial 
system. Social science researchers offer the opportunity to evaluate legal policy based 
on studies of human motivation and behavior.
 Communication plays an important role in the development of trust in legal 
authorities and procedures. It is important to consider how the communication 
between legal professionals and clients influences clients’ perceptions of fairness.69 
The authors’ perspective, based on the procedural justice literature, is that the sense 
of being treated fairly is largely dependent on a process where clients are fully 
informed in accessible language about the procedures and criteria for legal decisions 
and are shown respect in the way they are treated by the legal professionals.70
 C. Interpersonal and Cultural Considerations
 Knowledge of systems and human development alone does not make one an 
effective practitioner. The social science theories also direct lawyers’ attitude and 
behavior toward clients. Effective client interactions require specialized skills and 
perspectives to arrive at positive client outcomes. The relational approach focuses on 
four key dimensions for approaching clients to build positive relationships consistent 
with a family systems perspective: (1) culture, (2) empowerment, (3) strengths, and 
(4) emotion. None of these perspectives is monolithic, but rather each reflects a rich 
and diverse body of research.71
 Clinical legal scholars have made rich contributions to our understanding of the 
role of cultural considerations in the teaching and practice of law.72 A relatively new 
field worth noting is the increasingly studied phenomenon of “racial microaggression” 
68. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 361 
(2001).
69. Id. at 370–72.
70. See, e.g., Kevin Burke & Steven Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction: A 
White Paper of the American Judges Association, 44 Ct. Rev. 4 (2007–08), reprinted in Relationship-
Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 215, 217–18 (“The belief that one can go to legal authorities 
with a problem and receive a respectful hearing in which one’s concerns are taken seriously is central to 
most people’s definition of their rights as citizens in a democracy.”); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedural 
Context & Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. of Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 767 (1997), reprinted in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, 211–15.
71. David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 220 
(1995), reprinted in Relationship-centered lawyering, supra note 54, at 25.
72. See, e.g., Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 Clinical L. 
Rev. 33 (2001); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, 
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Classes, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (1993); 
Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 345, 346–47 (1997); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across 
Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 373 (2002); Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: 
Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 Clinical L. Rev. 369 (2005); Christine Zuni 
Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 557 
(1999).
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day-to-day verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, which may be intentional 
or unintentional, but which nonetheless communicate racial slights or insults toward 
people of color or other historically oppressed groups.73 Although the recognition of 
the existence of this phenomenon is not new, social scientists have recently found 
innovative ways to categorize and study these seemingly invisible and innocuous 
interpersonal dynamics.74
 The next two components, the empowerment and strengths perspectives, represent 
two practice models that have become fundamental components of social work 
training and education.75 The common and consistent theme of the empowerment 
perspective76 is one of facilitating the empowerment of clients against a socio-political 
and historical backdrop of understanding and critiquing oppression in all of its forms. 
This perspective is particularly useful with client populations that have traditionally 
been lacking in any kind of political power, yet it is also useful for clients that might 
otherwise be perceived as powerful in society. The point is that a fundamental aspect 
of the lawyer’s work is to ensure that the client is able to give voice to his or her 
unique perspective and to remind the lawyer that no matter how much the lawyer 
empathizes or understands the client’s situation, each client’s situation is unique.
 The strengths perspective focuses on the notion that all people and environments 
have significant strengths that can be marshaled to improve the quality of clients’ 
lives.77 This shift toward a deeper respect for a particular client’s frame of reference 
is especially important in the context of practicing with diverse groups. As such, this 
approach is consonant with and reinforces both the cultural competence and 
empowerment perspectives.78 A strengths-based practitioner is like an ethnographer 
with a goal of learning about the lived experiences, meaning, and values of the 
client.79 Approaching a client with this orientation enables a client to express those 
things that are important from the client’s perspective.
73. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559 (1989), reprinted in Relationship-
Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 239; Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in 
Everyday Life, 62 Am. Psychologist 271 (2007), reprinted in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, 
supra note 54, at 253.
74. This discussion draws from previous work found in our book, Relationship-Centered Lawyering, 
supra note 54. See, e.g., Wing Sue et al., supra note 73, at 256–58.
75. Peter De Jong & Scott D. Miller, How to Interview for Client Strengths, 40 Soc. Work 729 (1995), 
reprinted in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 294; L.M. Gutierrez et al., A 
Model for Empowerment Practice, in Empowerment in Social Work Practice: A Sourcebook (L.M. 
Guitierrez et al. eds., 1998), reprinted in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 288. 
76. This perspective is comprised of ethics and values defined by the field of professional social work 
combined with political-economic theory focused on the significance of power in social relationships, 
and a highly collaborative practice framework.
77. Other important aspects include the need to partner with clients to define their strengths and the 
notion that a consistent emphasis on strengths will improve the client’s motivation to make changes 
tailored to his or her specific needs. See De Jong & Miller, supra note 75, at 295. 
78. Id. at 294.
79. Dennis Saleebey, The Strengths Perspective in Social Work Practice 63 (5th ed. 2009).
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 Finally, as noted elsewhere in this article,80 analytical thinking is only one sub-
set of what is needed to make a successful lawyer.81 Lawyer satisfaction depends on 
interpersonal and intrapersonal capacities and thus argues for the cultivation of 
emotional intelligence for lawyers. High levels of emotional intelligence can lead to 
greater competencies in professional skills such as all forms of communication and 
persuasion.82 Emotional intelligence also allows lawyers to have increased capacity 
for empathy, which supports their ability to be sensitive to and accepting of the 
emotional lives of others.83
 Legal thinking tends to be linear, based on sequential steps that move in some 
logical order. For these tasks, traditional analytical skills are necessary. RCL requires 
a more nuanced form of analysis that includes the personal, social, cultural, and 
psychological aspects of a situation. For these tasks, new theoretical and psychological/
emotional skills are required.84
 The investigation of emotion by legal scholars has recently moved into a more 
theoretical and conceptual realm with respect to the role of emotion in legal 
decisionmaking and negotiation. Alongside the ascendance of these esoteric 
endeavors, there is a persistent drumbeat to try to teach lawyers how to perform 
better at interviewing and counseling their clients using well-tested and proven 
knowledge drawn from the mental health professions. Mental health professionals 
have come forward to offer lawyers concrete guidance about incorporating knowledge 
drawn from the mental health fields to carry out their daily work as counselors and 
interviewers of clients more effectively.
Vi. LEgaL EdUCatiOn CritiqUEs
 Two recent high-profile reports, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession 
of Law (the “Carnegie Report”)85 and Best Practices for Legal Education (the “Best 
Practices Report”)86 support the need for RCL as an organized theoretical framework 
that can be used to educate future lawyers as well as current practitioners in a more 
80. See discussion supra Parts II–IV and infra Part VI.
81. See generally Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 
1173, 1173–80 (1999) (discussing how emotional intelligence is essential to good lawyering and arguing 
that it can and should be cultivated in law schools). Marjorie Silver has been a leading scholar in the 
effort to educate the legal community about emotional intelligence. See also Marjorie A. Silver, Love, 
Hate and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, in Relationship-Centered 
Lawyering, supra note 54, at 303, 305 (“Lawyers must develop awareness of the unconscious behavioral 
traits and impulses that affect their interactions with clients and others.”).
82. John Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education: Strengthening the 
Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 323 (2008).
83. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, supra note 81, at 1178; see also infra Part IX.A–B.
84. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 
193 (1995), reprinted in Relationship-Centered Lawyering, supra note 54, at 28.
85. See generally Carnegie Report, supra note 42.
86. See generally Best Practices, supra note 42.
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holistic and humanistic manner. The highly influential Carnegie Report emphasizes 
the need for legal education to focus more attention on the formation of professional 
identity along with teaching theory and practice.87 The Carnegie Report refers to 
three “apprenticeships” that are essential components of legal education: (1) 
intellectual or cognitive, (2) practice-based/performance skills, and (3) identity and 
purpose.88 The Carnegie Report’s concern is the lack of a body of theory or science 
for the third apprenticeship. The Carnegie Report therefore advocates that the 
apprenticeships related to practice and to the ethics and values of the profession be 
“scientified,” or articulated in terms of theories and principles that can be taught and 
applied to different contexts.89
 RCL represents an important first step in the development of a “science” of legal 
professionalism, as captured by the “components of expert practice” mentioned in the 
Carnegie Report.90 These components include interviewing and counseling, as well 
as the intangible qualities of expert judgment and discernment.91 When viewed as a 
cohesive body of theory, this relational model can, in the words of the Carnegie 
Report’s authors, “serv[e] to legitimate the construction of new forms of recognized 
competence.”92 One element of this model, which is highlighted within the report, is 
the role of lawyer as “cooperative problem-solver,” which is described as a new 
normative model of professionalism for the student and could equally be presented as 
a new normative model for the practice of law.93
 The Best Practices Report advocates the development of competence—the ability 
to resolve legal problems effectively and responsibly—as a primary goal for legal 
education.94 Competence requires the integrative application of knowledge, skills, 
and values similar to the Carnegie Report’s three apprenticeships. The Best Practices 
Report’s authors point out that competence is “context-dependent” in that it represents 
the interplay between the lawyer, the lawyer’s task, and the legal framework in which 
the tasks must take place.95 The Best Practices Report thus advocates the need for 
“context-based” education in order to develop practical wisdom or practical judgment, 
which is identified as essential to creative problem-solving.
 This notion of the need for “contextualization” of legal education and practice, or 
“context-based education” 96 is an essential aspect of a relational approach, as reflected 
in the systems-based approaches that are central to this framework. Both reports 
87. Carnegie Report, supra note 42, at 13.
88. Id. at 27–29.
89. Id. at 104.
90. See id. at 115–20.
91. Id. at 115.
92. Id. at 113.
93. Id. at 102.
94. Best Practices, supra note 42, at 60.
95. Id. 
96. Carnegie Report, supra note 42, at 95 (citing Best Practices, supra note 42).
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recognize that the expert legal professional needs to comprehend fully a highly 
contextualized understanding of the client, case, and situation.97 Contextualization 
also means the exploration of moral and ethical-social issues as integral elements of 
legal representation, including the qualities of compassion, respectfulness, and 
commitment.98
 Similar to the Carnegie Report, the Best Practices Report makes the case for 
greater emphasis and intentionality connected to the teaching of what it calls 
“affective skills.”99 These skills include values, attitudes, and beliefs such as how 
students related to clients, how they respond to ethical concerns, and how their values 
inform their role.100 Roy Stuckey and the other contributors to the Best Practices 
Report strongly support “supervised practice” as more effective than classroom 
instruction for purposes of teaching the standards and values of the legal profession 
and for inculcating a commitment to professionalism. “[S]upervised practice is more 
effective than classroom instruction for teaching the standards and values of the legal 
profession and instilling in students a commitment to professionalism.”101 At the 
same time, the Best Practices Report cautions that there are a number of important 
criteria for achieving these goals through externships. These criteria include the need 
for high-quality supervision, a high level of engagement between the institution and 
the field placement, and significant student preparedness and interaction with faculty 
as well as field supervisors.
 In addition to these two highly influential publications, a third source of critique 
has been the Humanizing Legal Education (HLE) movement. The rapid growth 
and increasing popularity102 of this movement lends further support to the case for a 
relational approach to the teaching and practice of law. Part of the impetus for this 
movement has been the recognition that bringing about changes in the legal culture 
needs to begin with focusing on how we educate emerging legal professionals. 
Professor Barbara Glesner Fines, a leading voice in this movement, describes three 
components: (1) eliminating or minimizing unnecessary stressors; (2) assisting 
students in becoming “confident, caring, ref lective professionals”; and (3) aiming 
toward humanizing the profession by recapturing the essential professional values of 
97. Id. at 115.
98. Id. at 144, 146.
99. Best Practices, supra note 42, at 167.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 154.
102. At the two most recent Annual Meetings of the Association of American Law Schools, which took 
place in January 2009 and January 2010, the sessions sponsored by this section (known as the “Section 
on Balance in Legal Education”) were delivered to a packed audience. For additional information on the 
section and its activities, see Section on Balance in Legal Education, The Ass’n of Am. L. Schs., http://
memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=ChpDetail&chp_cst_key=9fb324e8-e515-
4fd3-b6db-a1723feeb799 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
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peacemaking, problem-solving, and justice work.103 The HLE movement has quickly 
grown in popularity within the legal academy to the point that in 2006 the AALS 
established a new section focused on “Balance in Legal Education.”
 The HLE movement has drawn much of its momentum from the Carnegie and 
Best Practices Reports, which in turn have reinforced the concerns raised by the 
HLE movement—that is, they focus on the extent to which legal education has not 
given sufficient attention or emphasis to the inculcation of professional identity and 
values among law students. These reports invite legal educators and practitioners to 
consider normative theories that address contextualized approaches to human 
development, as well as other important considerations to the development of a 
professional identity and values, which arguably should include extra-legal 
considerations that are interpersonal and/or cultural.
 Further, these developments related to legal education amplify the need to 
develop an organized framework for presenting this wealth of knowledge in ways 
that are useful to a wide range of individuals working in the legal system. The 
relational model delineates three areas of competency, each of which is heavily 
supported by a body of empirical research. Taken together, these competencies offer 
a simple framework that, as we hope to demonstrate, can provide the necessary 
grounding upon which clinicians can teach, and students can build, critical 
understanding about ethical and professional conduct in legal practice.
Vii. highLights Of rELEVant CLiniCaL sChOLarship
 A. How Relationship-Centeredness Enhances Client-Centeredness
 Since its development, the dominant approach to legal counseling has been the 
client-centered approach.104 Relationship-centeredness specifically and directly builds 
upon and enhances client-centered lawyering and is in no way a departure from it. In 
contrasting relationship-centeredness with client-centeredness, it is important to 
remember that these approaches are entirely consistent. Indeed, client-centered 
representation is a subset of the relationship-centered approach, and a visual depiction 
of the two models could easily be concentric circles, with the relational model as the 
outer circle. By illuminating the broader context in which the lawyer-client 
relationship exists, the elements of relationship-centeredness sharpen the lawyer’s 
ability to counsel and advise the client more effectively. On the other hand, a lawyer 
who is not an effective counselor and advisor may be genuinely client-centered, but 
will nonetheless be ineffective.
103. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Humanizing Legal Education: An Introduction to a Symposium Whose Time 
Came, 47 Washburn L.J. 235, 239–40 (2008) (citing Barbara Glesner Fines, Fundamental Principles 
and Challenges of Humanizing Legal Education, 47 Washburn L.J. 313, 313 (2008)). Other leading 
voices include Professors Gerry Hess, Larry Krieger, Bob Schuwerk, Susan Daicoff, and Marjorie 
Silver. For additional information, see Humanizing Law School, The Fla. State Univ., http://www.
law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/humanizing_lawschool/humanizing_lawschool.html (last visited Oct. 
13, 2011).
104. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 
12 Clinical L. Rev. 369 (2006).
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 An example of this contrast would be an attorney whose client is extremely angry 
toward the opposing party, perhaps one of two divorcing spouses. This client wants 
to litigate the divorce to the bitter end, regardless of the fact that the couple has two 
school-aged children who are already upset about their parents’ divorce. The parties 
come before the judge, who refers them to mediation and urges them to try to resolve 
as many issues as possible through mediation—at least for the sake of their children. 
Despite the judge’s urging, a purely client-centered attorney might simply let the 
client go through the motions of the mediation without exerting any real effort if 
that is the client’s inclination, and instead take the case to trial. Does the economic 
model we use to pay lawyers in the current adversarial system create incentives for 
lawyers to simply accept a client’s bluster as a rationale for increasing the conflict 
within the case by filing motions and negotiating using threats or intimidation since 
doing so is compatible with the lawyer’s own pecuniary interests?
 A family lawyer using the RCL would not only examine the client’s motives, but 
also take note of her own motives and consider with the client the implications of 
each strategy in the case. Litigating the entire case is almost certainly contrary to the 
children’s best interests and may also anger the judge and backfire on the client in 
terms of best outcomes. The lawyer, informed by RCL, might use interpersonal 
skills to explore with the client the relative importance of the issues in the case in 
order to more completely and accurately represent the client’s needs.
 A lawyer who practices in a relationship-centered manner will thus counsel the 
client on a number of issues, including educating the client about the impact of 
divorce, particularly high-conflict divorces on children, as well as the potential legal 
consequences of ignoring the judge’s guidance. Such a lawyer will try to assist the 
client in determining the client’s genuine interests, and in thinking through whether 
mediation may be a more advantageous route to achieving the client’s broader goals 
than adversarial litigation. The relationship-centered lawyer will also try to gain a 
better understanding of the basis for the client’s anger, and will try to help the client 
to separate out the angry feelings such that they do not interfere with the client’s 
ability to focus on the true interests related to the legal matter at hand, such as the 
children’s needs or the protection of the parenting relationship. The lawyer may also 
counsel the client to seek professional or informal help to address the client’s angry 
feelings in order to distinguish them from the legal process.
 This example demonstrates that a pure client-centered rubric simply does not go 
far enough in taking account of the wealth of knowledge our profession has gained 
since that approach was first introduced.105 Relationship-centeredness is not merely a 
new term—it reflects a comprehensive framework that reshapes lawyers’ perspectives 
on how best and most effectively to serve our clients. The relational approach provides 
the theory and skills to assess the client, the client’s systems, the context of the case, 
and many other factors that lead to enhanced client-centered practice. As such, 
relationship-centeredness can greatly enhance attorney-client relationships at the 
105. Indeed, recent scholarship on client-centered counseling draws a similar distinction between a 
“traditional” client-centered approach and “engaged client-centeredness.” See Stephen Ellmann et al., 
Lawyers and Clients: Critical Issues in Interviewing and Counseling 6–7, 72–76 (2009).
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micro-level, and, ultimately, has the potential to transform the professional culture of 
lawyers and their role in society.
 Some scholars might argue that the approach articulated above, which takes 
account of the client’s context as well as the other relationships involved, is essentially 
a client-centered approach. One of the difficulties with this admittedly popular and 
influential model is that it has come to mean different things to different people. 
Katherine Kruse, in a 2006 Clinical Law Review article summarizing the development 
of the client-centered model, acknowledges that rather than representing a single, 
coherent approach, client-centered representation “has evolved naturally into what 
might be called a plurality of approaches, which expand aspects of the original client-
centered approach in different directions.”106 Kruse goes on to say that while perhaps 
the common thread among interpretations of this model is an emphasis on lawyer 
neutrality, different proponents have emphasized a wide range of values, including 
lawyer-client collaboration, narrative theory, holistic lawyering, client empowerment, 
and even traditional zealous adversarialism.107 Although Kruse’s article makes a 
valiant attempt to reconcile these disparate approaches, her nearly 100-page article is 
itself a testament to the timeliness of introducing a new rubric and new terminology 
to capture the important influences on our work as lawyers, judges, and law teachers, 
as well as changes within the legal profession in the past three decades.
 Kruse expresses concern about the narrowness of a strict interpretation of client-
centeredness:
[T]he client-centered approach to problem-solving can obscure important 
factors such as the client’s personal connections and responsibilities toward 
others; the larger context of the systems within which the client operates; and 
the connections between the client’s individual problems and social justice 
issues at stake in the representation.108
She further states that “[b]y limiting lawyer intervention to a strategy of last resort, 
the client-centered approach misses the opportunity to theorize the more subtle, 
interactive, collaborative, and client-empowering interventions that have arisen in its 
wake.”109 Yet, even if we acknowledge, as does Kruse, that client-centered 
representation is under-theorized and is more pluralistic than it was at its conception, 
critiques such as hers limit themselves to the same terminology and do not reflect the 
current state of knowledge within our profession.110
106. Kruse, supra note 104, at 371.
107. Id. at 371–72.
108. Id. at 392.
109. Id. at 399.
110. Kruse ultimately uses the notion of “client autonomy” as a unifying principle to organize the disparate 
threads she has identified within the evolved client-centered model. See Kruse, supra note 104. While 
we support the importance of autonomy as an aspect of client empowerment, RCL also emphasizes the 
importance of appreciating the client-in-context, including the context of and those surrounding the 
attorney-client relationship.
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 B.  How a Relational Model Informs Experiential Pedagogy: The Debate over 
“Ecological Learning”
 The reframing from client-centeredness to relationship-centeredness also requires 
a rethinking of what, how, and where we teach certain competencies within the law 
school curriculum. For the purposes of answering the question as to whether we can 
teach students to be ethical professionals, it is useful to examine the question of what 
we know about how students learn. As stated earlier, there is a small, yet significant 
body of work within clinical scholarship focused on how students learn.111 Within 
that literature, there has been some exploration about how exactly students learn 
“experientially.” Much of this discussion has been framed in terms of the curricular 
structure or clinical model that has been used: whether the course is an “in-house” 
clinic, or some sort of field placement or externship. Pursuing that discussion or, as 
it is often framed, that debate, on conventional terms may well be misguided, 
particularly for the purposes of this article.112 Another perhaps more useful thread of 
this discussion focuses on whether students’ learning needs to be more “top-down,” 
meaning that the learning is driven by the person directly supervising their work, or 
whether students can learn more effectively from exposure to colleagues and the 
many other inputs that are part of a real-world work environment. This debate, which 
is captured by the work of two prominent legal scholars, Brook Baker and Robert 
Condlin, provides a helpful illustration of how the organized and comprehensive 
normative framework of RCL can contribute significantly toward filling in the gaps, 
meaning that it can aid in providing the needed foundation for student learning. The 
value of the relational model transcends the particular modality through which the 
learning is experienced. Thus, a relational approach can inform experiential learning 
regardless of whether the educational experience is structured as an in-house clinic 
or a field placement.
 Professor Brook Baker and others representing the Northeastern Law School 
have been proponents of what they refer to as the “ecological learning model.” They 
developed this pedagogical model based on their school’s unique co-op model,113 
which is in many ways akin to a more typical work experience than most clinical 
programs. Indeed, Baker’s ecological model focuses mainly on the value of the work 
experience itself—apart from any input that may be provided by law school faculty. 
111. See infra Part IV.
112. In a forthcoming article, Susan Brooks sets out an alternative pedagogical scheme for contrasting 
different experiential modalities (i.e., simulations, field placements, and in-house clinics). See Susan L. 
Brooks, Meeting the Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a Relationship-Centered 
Experiential Curriculum, 41 U. Balt. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011).
113. For a list of the key features of Northeastern’s co-op model, see Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning 
Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 45 J. Legal Educ. 1, 6–7 (1995) (“The most 
important points about Northeastern’s program are these: the school requires successful completion of 
four different internships (‘co-ops’) for graduation; each co-op involves three months of full-time legal 
work in a law office under the supervision of a legal practitioner; and the school’s co-op office provides 
extensive guidance and administrative support to keep the process working but does not ‘place’ the 
students.”).
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Baker contrasts the clinical model, which he describes as “role-centered, education-
focused, and supervisor-centric”114 with the ecological model, which he describes as 
participatory, contextualized, and collaborative.115 He describes his preferred model 
as follows:
In the complex interpersonal ecology of practice, students can learn, and learn 
well, through the central, f luid dyad involving the supervisor/expert and the 
student/novice—a dyad emphasized in current clinical theory. However, they 
can also learn from participation itself and from collaborative interaction with 
[a] broader array of legal workers and peers—additional social resources 
emphasized by a theory of ecological learning.116
Baker’s model provides an extensive analysis of how students learn through 
participation in a law office, irrespective of the particular strengths and weaknesses 
of their supervising attorneys. Nevertheless, he describes his model as incomplete 
and acknowledges the need to develop further guidance related to self-directiveness, 
self-realization, and identity formation, which he calls the “personal dimension” of 
ecological learning, as well as other workplace or societal barriers to participation.117
 It is these potential hazards of learning from participation itself and from the 
social milieu of the workplace with which Robert Condlin has taken issue. A few 
years after Baker and his colleagues presented their ecological learning model, 
Condlin conducted what he termed a “modest” empirical study of students’ reflections 
on their externship experiences. After finding that “students—and supervisors—
frequently were more secretive than open, more controlling than curious, more 
indirect than candid, more locked into pre-set views than interested in discovering 
new perspectives, and more intent on taking unilateral control than on sharing 
authority,”118 Condlin concluded that “legal education’s longstanding nervousness 
about apprenticeship or externship instruction has a basis in fact.”119 More importantly 
for our purposes, Condlin was worried that the communication patterns in the 
practice world might end up discouraging student reflection rather than enhancing 
it, because of the persistence of students’ fear of “looking stupid,” in the face of 
supervisors who, at least from the students’ perception, were not their colleagues, and 
could not be trusted with their candid criticisms or questions.120 He was also 
concerned that potential solutions, such as trying to teach students interpersonal 
114. Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the Interpersonal Ecology of 
Practice, 6 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 8 (1999). 
115. Id. at 23–40. 
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id. at 81. For Baker’s proposed approach to filling that gaps, see Brook K. Baker, Practice-Based Learning: 
Emphasizing Practice and Offering Critical Perspectives on the Dangers of “Co-op”tation, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 619 (2011–12).
118. Robert J Condlin, Learning from Colleagues: A Case Study in the Relationship Between “Academic” and 
“Ecological” Clinical Legal Education, 3 Clinical L. Rev. 337, 416–17 (1997) (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 417. 
120. Id. at 414–22.
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skills, or as he refers to them, the skills of “relational agency” might not succeed 
because “the obligations of relational agency are complicated, occasionally work at 
cross purposes, and differ from one setting to the next.”
 RCL offers a framework that can assist in addressing Baker’s and Condlin’s 
contrasting views. Some may find it surprising to learn that the optimal approach 
under a relational model would likely incorporate elements of both of their 
perspectives. Baker and Condlin both seek to provide students with meaningful 
learning opportunities—specifically, learning experiences that will allow students to 
appreciate the importance of context and fair and just processes, and also interpersonal 
skills and values such as non-judgmentalism and respect for cultural and other 
differences. What they both seem to acknowledge as missing from these programs is 
a normative theoretical grounding that can inform and guide students in connection 
with their work experiences. RCL can potentially help to provide that normative 
guidance. The relational model shares with Baker’s approach an emphasis on the 
importance of contextualized learning, and offers specific theories to assist students 
in gaining a basic grasp of how human beings and human systems operate. Like 
Condlin’s approach, the relational model is also concerned with teaching critical 
thinking about fair and just legal processes, so that students can view their field 
experiences and the legal institutions they are exposed to with a curious and, in some 
cases, appropriately critical lens.
 Additionally, despite their misgivings about whether interpersonal competencies 
can be taught, both scholars recognize the need to teach interpersonal skills to law 
students in order to help the students become caring and ethical professionals. The 
relational model provides specific guidance that, if taught effectively, can enlighten 
students about the interpersonal and affective aspects of legal practice. In addressing 
all of these aspects, RCL offers students highly useful tools for navigating many of 
the issues that often arise in legal practice given the generally complex web of 
relationships that permeate any legal setting. The remaining variable is the quality of 
training and level of commitment supervising attorneys in the field possess and their 
ability to provide a safe learning environment for students to explore ethical and 
practice dilemmas and to ask questions and reflect on their practice. This variable 
can be impacted through increased training and support from clinical legal educators 
and the creation of opportunities for students to supplement site supervision with 
campus-based groups and seminars facilitated by full-time faculty.
Viii. stratEgiEs fOr tEaChing EthiCaL and prOfEssiOnaL COndUCt
 In addition to Baker and Condlin, many other clinical scholars have introduced 
useful perspectives on how to inculcate ethical and professional conduct in students 
in the context of experiential learning, particularly with respect to “live client” 
clinics.121 This section highlights five salient concepts drawn mainly from the field 
121. A great deal of this literature has been captured and excerpted in Clinical Anthology: Readings 
for Live-Client Clinics (Alex J. Hurder et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). Additionally, since the publication 
of the Carnegie and Best Practices Reports, there has been a proliferation of writing on teaching ethics 
and professionalism throughout the legal academy, including, notably, by law school deans and directors 
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of education that have been well accepted by clinicians, and are compatible with the 
relational framework. Taken as a whole, they offer guidance about effective places in 
the curriculum, as well as techniques and methods for teaching ethics and 
professionalism using the content of RCL.
 A. Andragogy vs. Pedagogy
 What we know from these scholars is that adults learn differently than children. 
The term “andragogy,” which refers to adult education, has become part of the lexicon 
of clinicians, thanks to scholars such as Frank Bloch and Fran Quigley, who imported 
the work of Malcolm Knowles and others in that field.122 The distinctive qualities of 
adult learners include an interest in being self-directed, an ability to draw on their 
personal experiences, an inclination toward learning subject matter that is relevant to 
their social roles, and an interest in being able to apply their learning immediately to 
solve problems.123 Knowles’ approach supports teaching ethical and professional 
conduct using methods that involve law students in decisionmaking and planning, 
and that create learning experiences in which students are actively engaged and can 
relate their own life experiences to helping to resolve the issues at hand.124 Bloch and 
Quigley share the view that an andragogically-based model would emphasize actual 
client representation with close supervision.125 Both also agree that simulations are 
less effective as a teaching method, although they may have some value if they are 
sufficiently connected to real experiences.
 B. Democratic Teaching 
 Quigley’s work highlights the idea of “democratic teaching,” drawing upon 
“critical theorists of adult learning” such as Paulo Freire and Jack Mezirow.126 
Democratic teaching builds upon Knowles’ emphasis on involving students in 
decisionmaking and planning, and is “based on adults’ capacity to learn through 
critical scrutiny of both their own and their culture’s values, assumptions, and 
beliefs.”127 His understanding of democratic teaching also draws upon the work of 
of legal writing programs. The latter group in particular stresses the importance of beginning this 
teaching in the first year, and focuses on opportunities to do so using creative methods, such as 
simulation-based exercises and literature drawn from the humanities. 
122. See Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 321 (1982) 
(citing Malcolm S. Knowles, The Modern Practice of Adult Education: Andragogy Versus 
Pedagogy (1970)) (pointing out that Knowles relied on the work of clinical psychologists Abraham 
Maslow and Carl Rogers); see also Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory 
and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 37 (1995) (citing Malcolm 
Knowles, The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species (4th ed. 1990)).
123. Bloch, supra note 122, at 328; Quigley, supra note 122, at 46–47.
124. See Bloch, supra note 122, at 331–32. 
125. Id. at 346; Quigley, supra note 122, at 52–69.
126. Quigley, supra note 122, at 47–48.
127. Id. at 47.
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John Dewey, whose “philosophy of adult education focuses on the extension of the 
skills of deliberation, civic awareness, and public advocacy to learners previously shut 
out of the democratic process.”128 Democratic teaching emphasizes “self-directed 
learning,” an idea that has become familiar in clinical legal education and is a 
common refrain in externship programs around the country in which students’ 
“clinical” supervision is provided by practitioners in the field. Self-directed learning, 
according to Quigley, suggests that legal educators should “loosen the reins” both in 
and outside of the clinic, and allow students to be involved in the selection of their 
clinical and other educational experiences.129 This approach is consistent with another 
well-accepted notion among educators, which is that different students learn in 
different ways.130
 C. Disorienting Moments
 Quigley’s other major contribution to the clinical lexicon is the idea of the 
“disorienting moment,” which also draws upon adult learning theory, specifically the 
work of Jack Mezirow.131 The idea of the disorienting moment is that opportunities 
for significant—“transformative”—learning arise when the learner confronts an 
experience that is unsettling or disturbing because it cannot be easily explained by 
reference to the learner’s prior knowledge.132 The change that can result from such 
moments is known as “perspective transformation” insofar as a single trigger event 
may cause the learner critically to reassess societal and personal beliefs, values, and 
norms.133 Disorienting moments have three stages: first, the experience, second, the 
exploration and reflection, and third, the reorientation.134 This theory has been tested 
and proven empirically, and those of us who have been teaching for a long time, 
particularly in clinical settings, know it to be true as part of our felt experience with 
students.
 Quigley focuses on “seizing” disorienting moments experienced by students in 
clinical settings as a tool for teaching social justice, although it seems like he could 
just as easily have been talking about teaching ethics and professionalism. He 
emphasizes the importance of providing an environment for exploration and 
ref lection, as well as providing the opportunity for reorientation, as necessary 
conditions for such transformative experiences to occur. The array of methods for 
128. Id. at 48 (citing Kenneth Teitelbaum & Michael W. Apple, John Dewey, in The American Radical 
183, 186 (Mari Jo Buhle et al. eds., 1994)).
129. Id. at 65–68.
130. For a thorough discussion of how legal educators can be responsive to a range of student learning styles, 
see Michael Hunter Schwartz et al., Teaching Law By Design: Engaging Students from 
the Syllabus to the Final Exam (2009).
131. Quigley, supra note 122, at 51–52 (citing Jack Mezirow et al., Fostering Critical Reflection in 
Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning 12–14 (1990)).
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id.
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facilitating this type of process in the classroom will be familiar to many of us. They 
include: student-to-student discussions, such as case rounds; student self-evaluation, 
such as the use of ref lective journals; and supervision sessions with individual 
students.135 
 D. Parallel Universe Thinking
 Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters have given us what might be interpreted as 
another lens on disorienting or disturbing moments that student experience: “parallel 
universe thinking.”136 Parallel universe thinking is one of the six “habits” they suggest 
can be inculcated in students that will help student achieve better cultural 
proficiency.137 It requires the learner to seek “other possible explanations or meanings 
for clients’ words and actions.”138 Parallel universe thinking bears a strong resemblance 
to “reframing,” a fundamental technique in social work practice.139 Reframing is 
defined as viewing a problem or an issue with a new outlook or understanding it in a 
new way. Both of these concepts provide useful tools for helping a student who has 
experienced a disorienting moment reflect on that experience in a way that promotes 
ethical and professional behavior.
 Bryant and Peters also describe three dynamics that help to contribute to a 
student’s cross-cultural sensitivity, which is a subset of ethical and professional 
conduct. These dynamics are: (1) nonjudgment, (2) isomorphic attribution, and (3) 
daily practice and learnable skill.140 Isomorphic attribution asks the learner to try to 
attribute the same meaning to the client’s conduct that was intended by the client, 
rather than solely as understood from the lawyer’s perspective. This dynamic requires 
an understanding of countertransference, as well as an appreciation of one’s own 
cultural biases. Further, it is significant that Bryant and Peters emphasize the 
importance of daily application of the skills and dynamics they discuss. Their work 
reminds us that genuine student learning can only effectively be integrated through 
constant reinforcement as well as thoughtful and reflective practice.
135. Id. at 57–62.
136. See Bryant, supra note 72, at 70–72.
137. The six practices are essentially: (1) employ narrative as a way of seeing the client in context, see id. at 65; 
(2) listen mindfully, see id. at 68–70; (3) use parallel universe thinking, see id. at 70–72; (4) speak 
mindfully, taking into account the client’s culture, see id. at 72–73; (5) work effectively with interpreters, 
see id. at 77–78 (encouraging students to “create settings in which bias and stereotype are less likely to 
govern”); and (6) apply the Habit Four analytical process continuously to identify miscommunication 
and appropriate corrective measures, see id. at 76.
138. Id. at 70. The authors identify this habit as playing a vital role in cross-cultural communication. Id. at 94.
139. Social workers often use reframing to try to offer a more positive perspective on something that is 
seemingly negative. See Karen K. Kirst-Ashman & Grafton H. Hull, Jr., Understanding 
Generalist Practice 324–25, 330, 332–33 (4th ed. 2006); Beulah Compton et al., Social Work 
Processes 412 (7th ed. 2005). In this way, reframing can potentially help one person—the lawyer—to 
empathize more effectively with another person—the client—or to understand content more clearly 
from the client’s perspective.
140. Bryant, supra note 72, at 90–100.
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 E. Reflection-in-Action
 Another highly regarded set of ideas that complement and build upon what has 
already been discussed come from Donald Schon’s work on educating the reflective 
practitioner. Schon is a scholar of educational theory and his ideas on inculcating 
professional confidence and judgment, published in the Clinical Law Review, have 
become a must-read for every new clinician.141 He discusses “indeterminate zones of 
practice,” problematic situations in which the learner experiences uncertainty, 
including situations that are unique to the learner or in which the learner experiences 
some conflict in trying to come up with a workable solution. These indeterminate 
zones may well be the kinds of experiences that produce disorienting moments as 
described earlier.
 Similar to Quigley, Schon emphasizes that indeterminacy can potentially be a 
rich source of professional education. Schon emphasizes that the ability to navigate a 
problematic situation requires acting and reflecting essentially simultaneously, that 
this “reflection-in-action” is what seasoned professionals do, and that such reflection 
is what we need to inculcate in our students.142 Essential to that process is “reflection 
on ref lection-in-action,” meaning that learning professional competence requires 
discussions after the fact that help generate an understanding of what occurred in 
that disorienting moment. Schon calls this “educating for artistry,” and suggests that 
it can best be taught in a reflective practicum, which has the elements of learning by 
doing: close supervision, group process, and a context that is representative of the 
professional practice to which students aspire. Like Quigley (and those he borrows 
from), Schon also emphasizes that to be successful education must be a self-directed, 
self-learning process.
iX. psYChOLOgiCaL rEsEarCh tO sUppOrt an EXpEriEntiaL EpistEMOLOgY
 A. Moral Development: Nature, Nurture, or Both?
The view here is that we have lost our sense of how to foster virtue because 
we have neglected to develop intuitions for being present in the here and 
now, interdependently engaged with one another and deeply related to the 
natural ecosystem in which we live.143
 One important practical issue this article addresses is the question of whether a 
relationship-based approach to the law and experiential learning can enhance the 
development of professionalism in law students. In other words, are ethical lawyers 
born, made, or some combination of both? Can the epistemological approach in the 
curriculum and pedagogy of law school create practitioners with a different moral 
view and a higher level of professionalism in practice? How does the educational 
141. Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 231 (1995).
142. Id. at 247.
143. Darcia Narvaez, The Neurobiology of Moral Formation, in After You. The Ethics of the Pastoral 
Counselling Process (Marina Riemslagh et al. eds.) (forthcoming).
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process produce attitude change and/or ethical professional practice? We have argued 
that through education in specific social science theories, law students can be taught 
principles of relationship-building that can enhance attention to and understanding 
of the context of a client’s life and empathic connection with the client’s feelings. 
Then, through guided experiential education, students can have opportunities to 
apply the theory, practice relationship-building techniques, and explore the ethical 
issues that emerge in clinical practice. What is the evidence that an education guided 
by such an epistemology will create a generation of lawyers that is more ethical and 
professional in dealing with client situations?
 As discussed in Part II, the way people interpret particular situations is related to 
underlying moral character, which is informed by their background, experiences, and 
education. Furthermore, individuals will differ in their ability to recognize particular 
aspects of a situation and will evaluate and judge those situations as informed by 
their understanding of particular moral concepts.144 Darcia Narvaez argues that 
cultural practices actually shape the physical brain in child development,145 and 
further, the child’s cultural narratives establish what is considered normal.146
 Recent literature from the branch of psychology known as moral development 
provides further support for the positions taken in this article. Ariel Knafo and 
colleagues explored the factors that create a disposition toward empathy and the pro-
social behaviors associated with it. They identify compassion, an enhanced concern 
for the well-being of others in distress, as an important aspect of interpersonal 
responsibility and ethical behavior.147 Darcia Narvaez has explored the processes by 
which professionals develop ethical expertise integrating the enhanced understanding 
of human cognition based on the principle discussed earlier in this article that 
emotions precede thought and action. She argues for a “novice to expert” approach 
that provides opportunities to experience ethical dilemmas in examples and actual 
practice.148 While acknowledging that morality is self-authored, moral development 
can be facilitated with immersion experiences accompanied by a mentor who can 
guide the learner by offering discernment, explanation, and support through reflective 
experiences.149 The mentor can provide facts and skills that the student internalizes 
and that become patterned responses. Narvaez concludes that cultivating the right 
affect toward others creates an enhanced motivation for helping that person150 and 
144. See Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (1994).
145. Narvaez, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. See Ariel Knafo et al., The Developmental Origins of a Disposition Toward Empathy: Genetic and 
Environmental Contributions, 8 Emotion 737, 737 (2008). 
148. Darcia Narvaez, Integrative Ethical Education, in Handbook of Moral Development 703 (Melanie 
Killen & Judith Smetana eds., 2005).
149. Narvaez, supra note 143.
150. Darcia Narvaez, Moral Complexity: The Fatal Attraction of Truthiness and the Importance of MatureMoral 
Functioning, 5 Persps. on Psychol. Sci. 163, 172 (2010) (citing Kristen Renwick Monroe with the 
assistance of Connie Epperson, But What Else Could I Do? Choice, Identity and a Cognitive-Perceptual 
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this takes the learner beyond the ability to manage hypothetical situations to include 
managing real emotions and responses to actual clients.
 Consistent with the ecological learning approach, as well as Quigley’s discussion of 
disorienting moments, attitudinal change can even occur implicitly through the 
experience alone, and without conscious awareness.151 For example, when students 
experience discrepancy between closely held attitudes or beliefs and events that contradict 
them, they can respond to the cognitive dissonance with either changed attitudes and 
beliefs or judgmental self-justifying interpretations.152 While either response can reduce 
the discomfort caused by the dissonance, the social science foundation combined with a 
reflective practice approach would be more likely to produce the former response, even 
where the student has the experience without the level of supervision we would hope for 
in an optimal experiential learning environment.
 B. The Reasons Empathy Matters 
 In exploring the connections among professional roles, relationship experiences, 
and professional practice, we must address the concept of empathy. How is empathy 
developed? Is empathy an essential component of effective legal practice? Can 
empathy be influenced by education and experience, or is it more likely that self-
selection in professional education drives those more attuned to the emotions to 
professions like social work and psychology, and those more attuned to intellectual/
cognitive analysis to fields such as law and accounting?153 Recent cognitive/brain 
research has provided empirical understanding of how we develop empathy and learn 
from interactions with other people. For example, most psychologists now accept the 
presence of mirror neurons, which can be described as the corresponding firing of 
neurons in one person (in the same regions of the brain where they would be if the 
person had experienced the event personally) by observing or listening to the 
experience of another person. As Cristian Keysers and Valerie Gazzola write, this 
process involves:
[T]he actions, emotions and sensations of others are “translated” into the 
neural language of our own actions, emotions and sensations. By doing so, 
they have been transformed into what are called primary representations of 
these states. This could generate an implicit sharing and hence understanding 
of the states of others.154
Theory of Ethical Political Behavior, 15 Pol. Psychol. 201 (1994); Samuel Oliner, Extraordinary Acts of 
Ordinary People: Faces of Heroism and Altruism, in Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, and 
Religion in Dialogue 123 (Stephen G. Post et al. eds., 2002)).
151. Kevin N. Ochsner & Matthew D. Lieberman, The Emergence of Social Cognitive Neuroscience. 56 Am. 
Psychologist 717, 721–22 (2001).
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363
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
It is reasonable to conclude from this research that increased opportunities for law 
students to personally experience client stories first-hand would create more empathy, 
especially when the experience is enhanced by skill development and personal insights 
gained as students reflect on the experience.
 Can being more empathic lead to improvement in legal practice? Research over 
the past twenty years documents a number of areas of interpersonal relationships 
that are improved with the presence of empathy.155 We empathize more with those 
people we have formed an affective link with and who we perceive are acting in a fair 
and non-biased manner towards us. This process is not random or imagined but is 
actually managed by a series of neural responses in the brain.156 It follows that the 
development of trusting professional relationships characterized by improved empathy 
between lawyers and clients would add to the effectiveness of the representation. 
Compassion, the concern for the well being of others in distress, is an important 
aspect of interpersonal responsibility and ethical behavior.157
 Empathy can be defined as an affective state that is elicited by the observation or 
imagination of another person’s affective state.158 Ariel Knafo and colleagues add to 
the definition by distinguishing the cognitive and emotional components of empathy. 
“The cognitive aspect of empathy entails an ability to effectively comprehend a 
distressing situation, to recognize another’s emotions and assume that person’s 
perspective. . . . The affective aspect of empathy requires an individual to experience 
a vicarious emotional response to others’ expressed emotions.”159 Training and 
supervised practice helps law students and emerging legal professionals to recognize 
and articulate the expressed emotion and to formulate supportive statements and 
follow-up questions. In addition, through high-quality training and supervision, 
students can manage the felt experience of the expressed emotion and communicate, 
verbally or nonverbally, a sense of understanding to the client.160
155. For a detailed review, see Mark H. Davis, Empathy: Negotiating the Border Between Self and Other, in The 
Social Life of Emotions 19, 19–42 (Larissa Z. Tiedens & Colin Wayne Leach eds., 2004) (reviewing 
studies showing, for example, that perspective-taking has been linked with acting in less aggressive 
ways, experiencing less interpersonal conf lict, being more helpful to those in need, and providing 
supportive responses to peers).
156. Tania Singer et al., Empathic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 
Nature 466, 467 (2006).
157. Knafo et al., supra note 147, at 737.
158. Frederique de Vignemont & Tania Singer, The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why?, 10 Trends in 
Cognitive Sci. 435, 435–36 (2006).
159. Knafo et al., supra note 147, at 737.
160. For other discussions of teaching empathy in the law school context, see, e.g., Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, 
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X. COnCLUding thOUghts and rECOMMEndatiOns
 This discussion paves the way for the law school curriculum to be reformed and/
or refocused to teach RCL and to enhance the value of experiential learning at both 
the macro- and micro-levels.
 At the macro-level, law schools must undertake a close examination of the entire 
curriculum, beginning with the first year. There are undoubtedly rich opportunities 
for experiential and other creative teaching methods to be used so that students are 
engaged in the ways described above and are encouraged to experience disorienting 
moments upon which they can ref lect and begin to acculturate in the direction 
toward RCL. Part of this examination needs to include re-thinking our teaching 
methods that encourage more democratic teaching, in which faculty loosen the reins 
and give students more of a voice in the classroom.
 Perhaps beginning in the first year and as a core aspect of the upper-level 
curriculum, we need to maximize the opportunities for meaningful experiential 
learning in non-clinical courses by connecting them up with service learning projects 
or other real-world experiences wherever possible. At the same time, students need 
to be encouraged to develop competencies around collaboration, peer-to-peer 
learning, and team building. Hand-in-hand with these competencies, students can 
begin to develop greater empathy and other interpersonal and affective competencies 
that will help shape their professional identities in a more relational mode.
 We also need to incorporate multiple pedagogical methods, including the use of 
literature, film, and other materials drawn from the humanities to build students’ capacity 
for insight into the human condition and their ability to feel as well as think as they 
engage in experiences. Exploring the narratives of people engaged in legal cases can 
provide a foundation for the assumption of a relationship-centered approach to practice.
 Not surprisingly, the most effective teaching vehicles based on the research 
presented here will be actual clinical experiences—supervised practice, both in the 
externships and other field placements and clinics. “Ref lection on ref lection in 
action” is a key, so the effectiveness of these experiences will be enhanced by the 
quality of the supervision and other opportunities for student reflection. As described 
(and as well-known to this audience), the use of individual supervision sessions, peer 
learning, such as through case rounds discussions, and opportunities for student self-
reflection, such as through journals, are all useful methods.
 Reform at this level cannot begin and end with the formal curriculum. We must 
also re-examine the competitive and adversarial culture that pervades law schools 
through many of the extra-curricular activities and even the career development and 
on-campus interviewing processes. Instead, we must endeavor in as many ways as 
possible to instill a culture of mutual support, collaboration, and community-building 
within our institutions that might be considered as an implicit curriculum. It is worth 
noting that if we can succeed in this level of curricular and cultural change, we will 
be taking meaningful steps toward helping students to develop the same relational 
competencies as we want them to demonstrate in their professional lives.
 At the micro-level, the content of the discussions that take place, whether one-on-
one or in a group setting, can be guided and informed through exploration of the core 
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competencies within the RCL framework. What can be learned from an understanding 
of the client in context—be that the family system, neighborhood, or community? How 
do procedural justice issues affect the client and/or the situation? What is the interplay 
of cultural and interpersonal issues, including those that arise between (student) lawyer 
and client, and in other contexts, such as the student’s encounters with co-counsel or 
opposing counsel, and the client’s encounters with others in the legal system?
 As we begin to re-think these aspects of our legal institutions and to implement 
changes, we must develop fair, accurate, and reliable mechanisms for assessing 
whether and to what extent we succeed in accomplishing our goals. Specifically, we 
need to figure out the most effective ways of evaluating students’ achievements 
regarding the competencies within RCL, both at the individual student level, and at 
the curricular and programmatic level. The assessment at all levels should include 
the effectiveness of the processes, meaning what takes place in and outside the 
classroom, as well as identifying ways to measure our outcomes.
 Effective outcome assessment will thus require legal education to consider a 
broad vision of the competencies every law school graduate should master by 
graduation. Essential competencies should not be limited to those conventional 
analytical and communication skills measured in traditional law school exams. It 
should also include such things as interactional, relational, and negotiation skills, 
and the ability to analyze ethical dilemmas arising in legal practice. These latter 
competencies can be observed and measured in clinical practice experiences and in 
students’ written ref lections, enabling law schools to certify through outcome 
assessment that every law school graduate has attained competency in a more 
comprehensive understanding of the areas essential to effective legal practice. Like 
our colleagues in the other professional preparation schools, we will achieve student 
readiness for the profession with universal, robust, and meaningful practice 
experiences that are fully integrated into the curriculum.
 Further outcome assessment research might focus on the professionalism and 
ethical behavior of legal practitioners once they are in practice. Does the exposure to a 
legal education model that integrates relational social science content and provides 
enhanced practicum experiences make a difference in post-graduate practice? We must 
develop outcome measures to assess these issues: Are there differences in the number 
of ethics complaints or malpractice actions filed against lawyers coming out of programs 
that move to this educational model? Is there higher satisfaction with legal practice? Is 
there any change in public perception of the profession? It is essential that we identify 
outcome measures that will inform the evaluation of the changes we are proposing and 
that this research is used to shape future directions for the legal academy.
 Just as many of the ideas encompassed by RCL are not new, the ideas outlined 
above are at least somewhat familiar in the scheme of legal education generally, and 
even more familiar within clinical legal education. Yet, in the same vein as RCL 
which offers a way of grounding as well as organizing important ideas into a 
normative framework, we need a more grounded and organized approach to how we 
go about inculcating ethical and professional conduct in our students and, by doing 
so, in our next generation of practicing lawyers.
